THE CUMULATIVE UNANTICIPATED CHANGE IN INTEREST RATES: EVIDENCE ON THE MISINTERMEDIATION HYPOTHESIS
In an earlier paper (McCulloch 1977) we have argued that business fluctuations may arise as a consequence of the traditional mismatching of asset and liability maturities on the part of financial intermediaries.
We call this mismatching "misintermediation."
Briefly, that argument runs as follows: In the Fisherian model of the determination of the term structure of interest rates, planned supply of aggregate output of consumption goods is assumed somehow to match planned demand for these goods point by point throughout the future.1 As the economy moves forward in time, expectations regarding future interest rates, as reflected in the original term structure's implicit forward' interest rates, will, barring unforeseen technological developments or "dynamic inconsistency" in tastes, be perfectly realized. Furthermore, all supply and demand plans will be perfectly realized, and the economy will develop without aggregate excess demand or aggregate excess supply of current output ever appearing. The economy's growth rate will be relatively steady, and any residual fluctuations in it will have been fully anticipated.
However, we actually live in a world of institutionalized misintermediation. For centuries banking has been a highly regulated industry, and this regulation has kept it in its traditional mold of borrowing short and lending long, in spite of the the risks that that practice entails. This misintermediation breaks the link between current plans for future demand and current plans for future supply, a link that would exist to a much greater extent in the world of balanced 'For a modern restatement of this model, see 1-lirshleifer (1970) , 109-113. intermediation. Although the present discounted value of planned future demand must equal the present discounted value of planned future supply, there is no reason why planned supply will equal demand point by point throughout the future. As the economy moves forward in time, planned supply of current output will not necessarily match planned demand. In the event of a recession (an excess supply of current output in terms of prior plans), an unanticipated fall in interest rates will be necessary to clear the market for current output. In the event of a planned excess demand (a disequilibrius boom), an unanticipated rise in interest rates will be necessary.1
It is well known that interest rates are pro-cyclic. In fact, the NBER uses the peaks and troughs in various interest rate series to help date the standard reference cycles.2 If the yield curve were always flat, or at least had no systematic change in shape over business cycles, it would at once follow that the unanticipated changes in interest rates are in accord with the predictions of the misintermediation hypothesis.
However, Reuben Kessel (whose untimely death in 1975 was a great loss to the profession) demonstrated, in his classic work on The Cyclical Behavior of the Term Structure of Interest Rates, that at cyclic troughs the yield curve tends to be unusually upward sloping, so that immediately prior to an expansion, the market is expecting interest rates to rise. Furthermore, 1Cagan (1969) investigates the relationship between interest rates and business cycles. We, in contrast, argue that it is not so much the level of interest rates that is important, but rather whether the current level was arrived at by unanticipated changes.
2Burns and Mitchell (1947) .
at peaks, the yield curve is often "humped", reflecting a small liquidity premium at the short end together with anticipations of a fall in interest rates over the coming contraction (1965, . The casual evidence is therefore ambiguous. The market may be correctly anticipating the cyclical changes in interest rates, underanticipating these changes, or even overanticipating them.
The purpose of this paper is to determine how unanticipated changes in interest rates really behave over the business cycle. We do this by carefully analyzing the term structure of interest rates, and constructing a monthly series on cumulative unanticipated changes in interest rates.
This series is a sort of synthetic interest rate, changes in which over several months or years reflect entirely unanticipated changes in interest rates. We then examine how this series behaves over recognized business cycles, to see whether changes in it are in conformity with the misinter-1 mediation hypothesis.
DEFINITIONS
For the specific purpose of investigating the misintermediation hypothesis, the present author has developed a technique of curve-fitting the term structure of interest rates from security prices, so as to determine implicit forward interest rates as precisely as possible. This technique is described in detail in two previous papers (McCulloch 1971 (McCulloch , 1975b .
Briefly stated, for each point t in time for which we have security price 11f business fluctuations have any predictable regularity, their being associated systematically with certain unanticipated changes in interest rates violates the assumptions of rational expectations. However, in an earlier paper (McCulloch l975c), we have presented evidence that business "cycles" have no such regularity. See also Anderson (1977), and Savin (1977) . data, we estimate a "discount function" cS(t, in) which gives the value at time t of a promise to repay one dollar at future date s, where s=t+m (1) This function is constrained to obey (t, 0) = 1.
(2)
We would expect to find ô(t, in) > 0 (3) and D2c5(t, in) 
and in fact the empirical discount functions we estimated for this study all obey (3) and (4) without imposing them as constraints. This curve is roughly an exponential decay curve with respect to in, except that its rate of exponential decay need not be constant. Its average rate of decay is the single payment yield fl(t, in):
Its instantaneous rate of decay is the instantaneous forward interest rate p(t, s):
We define this rate in terms of the future date s, rather than the term to maturity in, in order to emphasize the importance of comparing the movement over time of the forward rate for a given date in the future. This instantaneous forward rate corresponds to a hypothetical forward contract for a loan one instant in duration, so its value for any one s is not of any great macroeconomic significance. More important is the mean forward interest rate r(t, s1, s) on a loan to begin at future date s and to end at future date $2' defined by t) 100 log 6(t,s2-t) With observations on the term structure tt years apart, we could consider
and compute the amounts (t) by which the forward rate on a loan to begin at t + t and to end at s*(t) is exceeded by the subsequently observed corresponding spot rate:
(t) = ri(t + t, s*(t)....t_ t) -r(t, t + M, s*(t)).
Then the series
1=0
would behave like an interest rate, yet first differences in it would, after adjustment for a liquidity premium, reflect pure unanticipated changes in interest rates.
However, the series defined in (12) is not entirely satisfactory.
In principle, with ideal data, we could estimate 5(t, m) and therefore p(t, t+m) for arbitrarily large m, even several hundred years into the future.1 The mean forward rate, because of its property (9), gives equal weights to p(t, s) for all these maturities. We would prefer somehow to
give greater weight to the immediate future, declining weight to the intermediate future, and little or no weight to the very distant future. Furthermore, in practice S(t, m) can only be estimated with decreasing relative accuracy as m becomes very large. At some maturity, perhaps 60 to 80 years, any empirical estimate of it would be insignificantly different from zero, even though we believe that it is "really" still positive.2 Beyond that point, mean forward rates defined by (7) lose all statistical significance.
Both these problems could be avoided by arbitrarily selecting a maturity, say 10 or 20 years, that one feels includes the most important forward rates. However, this procedure still gives equal weight to all included maturities. Furthermore, forward rates for the excluded maturities 11n the 1920's, there were railroad bonds outstanding with three, four, and even five hundred years to maturity.
2We have never actuallyused a data set with long enough maturities that this has happened, though in principle it should.
do affect to some degree the terms on which current output can be exchanged for aggregated future output. We would prefer not to disregard them altogether.
This problem can be solved by means of a new concept developed by Burman and White (1972) , called the "par bond yield". It has long been well known that the notion of a "bond yield curve" is somewhat ambiguous, since unless the yield curve is flat, bonds with the same terminal maturity but different coupon rates should not in general have the same internal rate of return or "yield to maturity") Even using the bond's "average duration" does not solve this problem. However, there is an unambiguous yield on bonds of maturity m that just happen to be selling at par. It does not equal the point payment yield, but is a well defined concept in its own right. It is now used by the Bank of England as the representative yield curve for coupon-bearing bonds, though it has not yet been officially adopted by the U.S. Treasury.
This par bond yield y(t, in) can be computed straightforwardly from the discount function, using the fact that if a bond is selling exactly at par, its yield just equals its coupon rate. If we assume continuous coupons for the sake of simplicity, this coupon rate can be found by solving the equation2
1See e.g. Buse (1970) . Schaefer (1976) offers some new insights into this familiar problem.
2Cp. Burman and White (1972, 484) , whose definition is in terms of a bond that pays semiannual coupons, and McCulloch (1975b, 822) ,where the definition is given in terms of an after-tax discount function.
The ideal properties of the par bond yield, from the point of view of the present study, arise from the following identity:
This identify implies that The approach we adopt in this paper is to compute a forward par bond yield, and then compare it to the subsequently observed corresponding spot par bond yield one month later. These differences, adjusted for liquidity premium, are again pure unanticipated changes in interest rates. When we accumulate these forecasting errors, changes in the resulting one-dimensional series over business cycle phases will also represent unanticipated changes in interest rates.
Three maturities are relevant here: rn,1, the distance into the future the implicit forward contract is to begin (which we will set equal to st), m2, the duration of the forward contract, and m3, the distance into the future of the completion date of the forward contract. We have rn1 + m2 = m3. The forward par bond yield b(t, m1, m3) is then the coupon rate that will make the value of a forward bond, evaluated at time t's term structure, just equal to par, discounted to time t using time t's term structure. To find this rate, we solve 'The obverse of this proposition is that when p(rn) is inferred from actual bond prices, it has an intrinsic tendency to become increasingly poorly defined as m becomes very large.
to obtain
By an operation analogous to (15) and (16), it can be shown that this forward bond yield is an average of the forward rates p(t, s) for s between t + in1 and t + in3, each weighted by 5(t, s-t). The differences
then represent, after adjustment for liquidity premium, pure unanticipated changes in interest rates.2
DATA
In order to abstract completely from default risk, the data we use are for U.S. Treasury Securities. Price data were assembled for the last business day of each month, from the end of December 1946 to the end of May 1977, a total of 366 months. Since these dates represent the dividing line between two months, they could equally well be associated with either month. We will refer to them in this paper as representing the "beginning" of the subsequent month, i.e., January 1947 to June 1977. In fact, the quotations 1 Cp. (14) above and McCulloch (1975b, 825) .
2Unfortunately, these differences of weighted averages of forward rates have no simple interpretation in terms of a weighted average of differences in forward rates, since the relative weights change between t and t + tt. Nevertheless, it can be shown that an across-the-board increase in forward rates, whatever the shape of the forward curve, will lead to a positive value of (t), even though the new term structure will be giving higher weights to shorter term forward rates, which might well be substantially lower than the longer term rates. (1975b, 817-822) for further discussion of these estate tax bonds.
tax-exempts and selected flower bonds, almost all U.S. Treasury Bills, Notes, and Bonds were included.
From this data discount functions were fit using a cubic spline, tax-adjusted technique similar to that described in McCulloch (1975c)) This technique was slightly improved by setting the "flat" price equal to the present discounted value of the sum of the after-tax semi-annual interest payments plus the principal, rather than using our earlier simplification of setting the "and interest" price equal to the integrated present discounted value of the after-tax couponspius the principal, which treats the coupons as if they arrived in a continuous stream. Before-tax equivalent instantaneous forward rates, single payment yields, and par bond yields were calculated from the parameters of this spline discount curve for selected standard maturities sufficiently close together to allow linear 2 interpolation when desired.
Appendix I indicates for each month the largest standard maturity less than or equal to the maturity of the longest outstanding security observed. For most months we have more than 20 and sometimes even 30 years of data, though there were a few years in the early 1970's when our rule for flower bonds forced us to cut back to 14 or even 13 years. Fortunately, these months had relatively high levels of interest rates so that forward rates beyond these maturities would have had relatively little weight in the par bond yield anyway. Appendix 2 shows the par bond yield for the longest available maturity for each month. This series also appears on 1The tax adjustment is especially important n the late 1950's and 1960's, when the long term market was dominated by bonds selling well below par and having a substantial capital gains tax advantage.
'These series, together with a batch version of the FORTRAN IV program that generated them, will be available from the NBER in New York, together with further description. The author takes sole responsibility for them, however.
Chart I. Although these rates (and the other rates discussed below) are at best accurate to 1 or 2 basis points (.01 or .02 percent per annum), we have tabulated them to the nearest tenth of a basic point, to prevent their stochastic properties from being affected in any way by rounding errors.
THE LIQUIDITY PREMIUM
For all 365 pairs of adjacent months, (t) was computed as in (19) , using the longest maturity available both at time t and (by interpolation) at time t + tat. Appendix 3 shows the accumulated sum of these increments. We have arbitrarily started the series at 2.241%, the longest available par bond yield at the beginning of January 1947.
Changes in this series are not pure unanticipated changes in interest rates, since forward rates are known to exceed expected future spot rates by a liquidity premium. Long (1972) has recently refuted the traditional Hicksian explanation of this premium in terms of risk aversion in the face of interest rate uncertainty, thus confirming the intuition of Bailey (1964, 554) that risk aversion can just as easily lead to a "solidity premium"
(negative liquidity premium) as a positive liquidity premium. Nevertheless, the evidence indicates that a positive liquidity premium does exist at the very short end of the term structure. This sort of premium could be due to the demand for liquid secondary reserves on the part of traditional banks, as suggested by Lutz (1940, 48) , or perhaps to interaction with the demand for money, as argued by Kessel (1965, 44-58) .
For the specific purpose of being able to adjust forward interest rates to infer participants' expectations of future interest rates, we * Because of reduction difficulties, Chart I is not included with this draft.
have, in a separate paper (McCulloch 1975a) , measured the size of this liquidity premium for a broad range of maturities, using data from 1947 to 1966. We found that if the term premium is not constrained to have any particular shape with respect to maturity, it cannot be estimated with any usable accuracy for implicit forward contracts longer than a year or so in duration. However, if we define the premium rr(m) on an instantaneous forward rate p(t, t ÷ m) as the difference between this forward rate and the market's expectation, as of time t, of the future "spOt" interest rate p(t + m, t + m), ir(m) = p(t, t + m) -EP(t + m, t + m), (20) we found that this premium does not differ significantly from the functional This functional form implies that the typical shape of the forward curve, as well as that of the yield curve, increases monotonically towards an asymptote 43 basis points above its lowest value. For the forward curve, it more than half-way approaches this asymptote in 2 months (1/6 year).
The yield curve approaches the same asymptote, but more slowly. A premium like this, that monotonically increases toward an asymptote, is consistent with the theories of Lutz and Kessel, so for present purposes we accept this functional form as valid.
Equation (21) implies a very small liquidity premium for forward contracts of long maturity. If m2 is the duration of the forward contract -15-(2 -S1 in definition (7)) , it can be shown that the premium is, at the .95 confidence level, less than 10/rn2 basis points, regardless of the distance into the future the forward contract is to begin (McCulloch 1975a, 115) . Thus, on a 10 year single payment implicit forward contract, the premium is less than 1 basis point, hardly worth bothering with by itself.
However, in the present paper we propose to accumulate 365 forecasting errors, so these liquidity premia may add up to a substantial sum. In order to adjust for this premium, we must derive the premium in a forward par bond yield implied by formula (21). Since expectations must fluctuate randomly (see McCulloch l975a, 98 text andn.6), we just have
for all m greater than tn.. Therefore
whence f p(t,t+m)5(t,m)dm b(t,rn1,m3) 
where m3
is the approximate value of the liquidity premium in the forward rate on a par bond of maturity to be bought or sold years, and m2 is again m3m1.
This approximate premium is a function of the exact shape of the discount function at time t, which makes it difficult to evaluate.
However, by a further approximation, we can obtain a simple expression for it. Suppose that R(t) is the "general level" of interest rates at time t (expressed as a fraction of unity rather than as a percentage), so that
Then (21) and (25) imply
(a+R(t)) (i_e_t)m2j 1 2
Note that although our specification (21) of the liquidity premium on instantaneous forward rates (and therefore on single payment forward rates as in (9)) does not depend on the level of interest rates, the derived approximate premium p(R(t), m1,m2) in (27) does depend on this level. This is because the forward par bond yield gives higher weight to shorter term p(t,s)'s, (which have the largest liquidity premia), the higher the level of interest rates. It will therefore be an increasing function of the level. To illustrate, if in1 is 1/12 years, is 20 years, and interest rates stand at 2½% (R(t) = .025), the premium will be 0.18 basis points (0.0018%). At 5% interest, the premium will rise to 0.22 basis points, and at 107., to 0.32 basis points. By themselves, these adjustments are well less than the measurement error in the forward par bond yield, but they will accumulate to a noticeable amount over 30 years.
Appendix 4 shows the accumulated sum of the increments iy(t) to each of which has been added a liquidity premium adjustment calculated with (27). For each month the current value of y(t, s*(t)_t)/l00 was used as R(t). As with the series in Appendix 3, we arbitrarily start this series at the initial level of the longest available par bond yield, 2.241%. In this case, however, it rises to 3.918%, instead of to 3.203%, a difference of 71.5 basis points over 365 months. This difference averages to about 0.20 basis points per month.
Our adjusted sum of increments still leaves a little to be desired.
First, there is no reason why it could not go negative, and thus behave unlike an interest rate series. To illustrate, suppose that initially the one-year rate stands at 2% and the two-year rate at 3%, so that participants expect next year's one-year rate to be 4% (abstracting from liquidity premium). If Instead next year's one-year rate is 1%, there will have been an unanticipated fall of 4 -1 = 3%. This fall will take the cumulative sum to -1%, even though all actual interest rates and expected rates are in fact positive. Nothing this extreme actually occurs, though we can find intervals when a rise in yields to maturity was actually overanticipated, and therefore represents an unanticipated fall in interest rates. There are only a few individual months for which this occurred, though it is not uncommon over periods of several months. One example is the period from January 1947 to August 1954, when the long term par bond yield rose from 2.241%,to 2.549%, a rise of 30.8 basis points, yet the cumulative sum of unanticipated changes fell from 2.241% to 1.853%, an unanticipated fall of 38.8 basis points.
A more important problem is that changes in the cumulative sum of unanticipated changes series reflect the actual unanticipated change in terms of percentage points, so that relative changes in this series do not ref 1ct similar relative differences between the expected par bond yield and the subsequent spot yield. For example, a rise from 6% to 8% represents the same percentage change in the price of a perpetuity (which a long term par bond approximates) as does a rise from 3% to 4%. Yet if the cumulative sum series happened to stand at 3% at the beginning of a month when the market was anticipating a 6% par bond yield for the end of the month, an 8% realization would drive the cumulative sum series to 5%, the same percentage point change, but twice the relative change, that actually occurred.
In order to correct both these problems, the series we should actually concentrate on is the multiplicatively cumulative unanticipated change in long term bond yields, which we will call y*(t). We again start this series at 2.241%, and thereafter define it by multiplying its previous value by the ratio of the realized spot yield to the previo.usly anticipated corresponding yield, adjusted for liquidity premium:
t, s*(t)_tJ_pR(t),t,s*(t)_t_tJ (28)
Relative changes in this series, even over several months or years, then represent the actual cumulative relative change in interest rates, even for periods when its value has drifted far away from the actual current level of interest rates.
In order to make it available for other researchers, we have shown the full series in Table 1 , page 21. It is never accurate to within less than a basis point, but we have again indicated the tenths of basis points so that its stochastic properties will be unaffected by rounding considerations.
If all changes in interest rates were correctly anticipated by the market, our series would never change, regardless of the behavior of current long-term interest rates. We therefore see from our series, that while minor fluctuations in interest rates were almost entirely unanticipated, the secular rise from 2.24% in 1947 to around 4.2% in 1965 was almost entirely anticipated by the market. On the other hand, the large rise in rates from 1965 to well over 7% five years later (following the adoption of inflationary financing to help acconmiodate the Viet Nam war), was almost entirely unanticipated, since it is accompanied by almost exactly the same proportionate change in y. The slight rise in rates from 1970 to 1977 was actually somewhat overanticipated, as indicated by a slight decline in y*.
EVIDENCE ON THE MISINTERMEDIATION HYPOTHESIS
Now let us turn to the object of our investigation, the direction of unanticipated changes in interest rates over historical business fluctuations. The misintermediation theory predicts unanticipated falls during disequilibrious contractions, and unanticipated rises during disequilibrious booms. Now the growth rate of the economy during a period of perfectly equilibrious development need not be constant. It probably will not be negative, but even that is not certain. Nevertheless, it seems safe to assume that recognized historical business tcyclesU, at least the larger ones, represent unanticipated changes in the growth of output of consumption goods, and therefore represent the sort of disequilibrium booms and recessions we are looking for. Source for dates: Zarnowitz and Boschan (1975, 28, and 1976, 26) .
we have indicated the percentage change in y*. We have computed this change logarithmically, as 100 times the change in the natural logarithm of y*, so that a 10% rise followed by a 10% fall will leave y* exactly where it started. Since a long-term par bond approximates a perpetuity, whose price is the reciprocal of its yield, these percentage changes roughly indicate the unanticipated fluctuations in the value of current output relative to a constant stream of future output. Thus, output in April of 1958 was worth 16.4% less in terms of future output than the market anticipated it would be worth eight months previously.
We see that in all but two of the eleven phases considered, the unanticipated change in interest rates is, indeed, in the direction predicted by the misintermediation hypothesis. Although, as Kessel determined, the market generally correctly determined the direction of change in interest rates, it systematically underestimated the total change, and did not overanticipate it. The evidence is therefore consistent with the assertion that most postwar U.S. business fluctuations were caused by the mismatching of intertetnporal consumption and production plans brought about by misintermediation.
The two exceptions are the contraction that set in as a consequence of the Arab oil embargo in late 1973, and the preceding expansion that was interrupted by the oil situation. Since it seems safe to assume that the Arab oil embargo was not caused by the maturity structure of the balance sheets of U.S. financial institutions, we may conclude that misintermediation is not responsible for all business fluctuations. Nevertheless, in every case when the unanticipated change in the value of output relative to future output is 10% or larger, the change is in the direction predicted by this hypothesis.
Because the Burns-Mitchell reference cycle concept only recognizes absolute reductions in output as contractions, it may overlook disequilibriously sluggish periods when the growth rate is positive but not as high as anticipated. Even for the fluctuations it recognizes, it may tend to place peaks too late and the troughs too early, since when a trend is added to a pure cyclic series, the maxima tend to be retarded and the minima advanced in time. To avoid these problems, Ilse Mintz has constructed a "Growth Cyclet chronology, shown in Table 3 In order to test whether the cumulative unanticipated change in interest rates is significantly pro-cyclic, we calcu1ted the mean monthly change in the logarithm of this series, separately for contractions and expansions. Mintz (1974,60) , Moore (1975, 159) and Zarnovjtz and Boschan (1976, 26) . This deflated series chronology is more widely accepted than Mintz's alternative undeflated series chronology (1974, 59) .
These results are shown in Table 4 , on page 27. In each case we excluded the changes that occurred during the actual peak and trough months, since it is ambiguous whether they belong to the expansion or to the contraction. 
where n is the number of observations on the change and n is the number of these observations where the change is positive, is asymptotically N(0,l), and enables us to test for the sign of the median change without relying on a normal assumption.'
'We do assume here that the distribution of forecasting errors is more or less symmetrical, so that the mean and median have the same sign. David etal. (1954, 491) .
We see that this statistic is significantly positive for both types of expansion. It is negative for both types of contraction, though it is not significantly so in either case. Since the median fall during contractions is not significant, it is important to test whether the probability of a rise is significantly higher during an expansion than during a contraction. This hypothesis can be tested with a simple 2 x 2 contingency table test (e.g. Mood et.al. 1974, 454) . This test produces a statistic which is asymptotically x2j if the probability is the same.
This statistic is significant at the .95 level if over 3.84, and we see that indeed the probability of y* rising is significantly higher during expansions than contractions for both chronologies.
For comparison, we also perform the same calculations for YL,the par bond yield for the longest available maturity, which is the series tabulated in Appendix 2. We see that it rises significantly during both Table 4 , though the t statistics are uniformly lower, in many cases losing their significance. Note however, that the standardized range indicates stronger leptokurtosjs in every expansion case, so that the normal assumption and t test are even less warranted than in Table 4 . Taking logarith apparently removes much of the heteroskedasticity in the changes, since the standard deviation of changes has happened to be almost proportional to the level of interest rates over our period. The non-parametric statistics are of course unaltered.
By every criterion (except the strength of rises during expansions), our synthetic cumulative unanticipated change in interest rates series y* is actually more reliably pro-cyclic than the long term interest rate This is true even though a series very similar to the latter is used to date both reference cycles and growth cycles.
We had hoped that the unanticipated change in interest rates would be significantly pro-cyclic, in spite of Kessel's finding that the market has systematically correctly anticipated at least the direction of change in interest rates over business cycles. To find that it is actually more reliably pro-cyclic than the long-term interest rate itself far exceeds our hopes for it. Furthermore, the pro-cyclic nature of our series is significant by many tests even when we include the oil recession of [1973] [1974] [1975] , which our misintemedjation theory can excusably be allowed not to .1 explain.
1Because of a mathematical identity, rises in forward rates go hand in hand with lower holding period yields for longer term obligations. Therefore, the type of evidence we have looked at here is similar in ultimate-nature to that investigated by Kessel and Clark (1976) . In their 2William Gibson has done some exploratory work in this direction.
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CONCLUS ION
The series we have constructed on the cumulative unanticipated change in interest rates provides strong evidence in support of the hypothesis that many business fluctuations of the type that have occurred in the United States since World War II are caused by the mis-matching of intertemporal consumption and production plans. We lay the ultimate blame for this problem on "misintermediation", the traditional failure by financial intermediaries to match the maturity structures of their assets and liabilities.
Our synthetic interest rate series turns out to be actually more reliably pro-cyclic than the simple long-term interest rate, this in spite of the fact that the latter is used to help construct the standard business cycle chronologies. It is hoped that this series will be of use to other researchers in macroeconomics, whether or not they accept its interpretation in terms of the misintermediation hypothesis. 'J 4 C C C (N . -l ,-4 ,-1 (N (N (N r' c' c (N (N (N (N (N (N (N (N ,-(N (N ( (N ,1 r1 (N (N (N (N C' c (N C C' (N (N (N ('.1 (N (N (N (N (N (N r1 ,-I -l (N (N (N -i CC Ncici(Ncici(Nci(N(Nci(N(N(N(N(N(N-- Henen-1-enenen 
